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THE LAW'S SECRETS 
Gary T. Marx* 
LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON 
LA w. BY Kim Lane Scheppele. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 363. Cloth, $54; paper $17.95. 
Does a psychologist have a duty to disclose his patient's threat to 
kill a former girlfriend? (Yes.) Can an apostate priest who fakes his 
own death and then seeks employment as a professor at a Catholic 
college using another name be barred from such employment? (Yes.) 
Has the seller of a house who fails to inform the buyer that there is no 
water between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. defrauded the buyer? (Yes.) Could a 
buyer of tobacco in New Orleans in 1812 withhold his knowledge that 
a peace treaty had been signed (a fact greatly increasing the price he 
would otherwise have had to pay) from a seller uninformed of the 
treaty? (Yes.) Eight years after treatment, can a psychiatrist publish a 
book that details a patient's thoughts, feelings, and fantasies, if during 
the therapy the patient consented? (No.) 
In this thoughtful book based on her dissertation in sociology at 
the University of Chicago, Kim Lane Scheppele1 helps us understand 
why the courts allow some secrets to be kept while requiring or at least 
not punishing the revelation of others. 
Given the centrality of information control to social life, it is amaz-
ing that so few sociologists have studied the topic in depth. Georg 
Simmel and Erving Goffman stand almost alone in devoting significant 
attention to the study of secrecy.2 Scheppele's logically and empiri-
cally persuasive study is thus very welcome. She moves the current 
debate about secrets and the law beyond the realm of rhetoric and 
avoids confusing what the scholar believes judges should do with what 
they actually do (although in a happy coincidence it turns out that 
Scheppele's morally preferred position is also best at ordering the em-
pirical data). While bringing conceptual order and depth to a tangled 
web, she shows the limited applicability of the law-and-economics ap-
proach for understanding the full range of common law secrecy cases. 
* Professor of Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. B.A. 1960, U.C.L.A.; 
M.A. 1962, Ph.D. 1966, University of California at Berkeley. - Ed. 
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, and Associ· 
ate Research Scientist in the Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan. 
2. E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION (1969); THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SJMMEL (K. 
Wolff ed. 1950); see also G. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988); 
SECRECY (S. Tefft ed. 1980); URBAN LIFE, Jan. 1980 (special issue devoted to secrecy). 
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Writing with clarity and economy of expression, she offers a model 
that will certainly inspire other social researchers. 
Scheppele restricts her attention to legal secrets involving contend-
ing parties whose cases come before a judge. How does Anglo-Ameri-
can legal culture treat such secrets? What counts as a legally 
protected secret among conflicting parties? When should individuals 
be compelled to reveal information to those with whom they deal? Is 
there a logical order to judicial action in such cases? If so, is it best 
captured by an economic view that argues that judges act to maximize 
efficiency through the creation of wealth, or by a contractarian view 
that stresses that judges act to create equality among contending par-
ties? Are legal secrets also efficient secrets, as claimed by those hold-
ing the law-and-economics view?3 She bases her answers not on 
deductions from first principles, or selective empirical illustration, but 
on a systematic sample of nineteenth- and twentieth-century legal doc-
trine as expressed in common law cases. Her convincing empirical 
conclusion is that "whatever else law and economics may be, it is not a 
descriptively accurate positive account of law" (p. 3). 
The economic theory suggests that judges will use rules to maxi-
mize efficiency. Information will be treated as private property and 
secrecy viewed as a legitimate means of protecting it when such pro-
tection is believed necessary for the information to be created. How-
ever, property rights will not be extended and disclosure will be 
required in those cases in which information would be produced re-
gardless of whether or not it is protected. 
The economic theory makes a distinction between casually and de-
liberately acquired information. For the latter, no disclosure is re-
quired. But efficiency is seen to require that information which is 
casually acquired should be passed along, in spite of any other objec-
tions of its subject or the potential discloser, unless such disclosure 
would make transaction costs too high. Conversational privacy 
should be protected since it will increase the flow of information, while 
personal privacy involving the protection of discreditable information 
should not be protected, since it is believed to decrease efficiency (pp. 
24-42). 
In contrast to the economic theory, Scheppele develops a con-
tractarian theory, drawing on the work of Rawls.4 This approach 
holds that law must be legitimate, beyond being merely efficient or 
orderly. It is legitimate when it is able to incorporate "those values 
and arguments that the losing side in a legal case would recognize as 
appropriate, even when the person finds herself losing as a result of 
their application" (p. 61). 
3. R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Infonna-
tion and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978). 
4. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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Contractarianism receives its moral power from giving individuals 
choices about how to live. Scheppele asks what sort of rules individu-
als would likely consent to live by with respect to strategic secrets. 
She suggests that the rational individual will separate secrets which 
cause extensive harm from those that cause little harm (to the un-
knowing party) and that only the former would have to be disclosed. 
In extreme cases, the "law ought to guarantee that people will not fall 
below a tolerable level as a result of harm caused by secrets" (p. 74). 
Individuals also will require protection from deeply held secrets which 
are unresponsive to discovery efforts, since their existence is unknown. 
In contrast to the law-and-economics approach, the contractarian 
approach makes a central distinction between deep and shallow 
secrets, a concern for equal opportunity to obtain information, and the 
need to preserve trust and confidence in relationships. When the pres-
ence of a secret is not suspected, or when information can more easily 
be obtained by one party than by another, disclosure should prevail. 
Where secrets are known to be present, or where information can be 
equally and easily acquired by either party or is closely connected to 
relations of trust, disclosure will not be required. However, con-
tractarian theory holds that if great harm would result from applying 
these rules too strictly, they should be modified. 
Scheppele examines the facts considered to be legally relevant in 
the areas of fraud, privacy, trade secrets, and implied-warranty cases. 
In developing an interpretive approach that stresses the mutually con-
straining impact of facts and rules, she argues that the superiority of 
the economic theory of law or the contractarian theory will be deter-
mined by "which can account for the facts that are selected to be 
sculpted and polished by judges" (p. 104). Scheppele argues that 
judges are much more likely to notice the facts emphasized by con-
tractarian than by economic theorists. 
The book has six sections. "Framing Secrecy" (pp. 1-53) considers 
the nature of secrecy and the law-and-economics view of it. "Develop-
ing a New Jurisprudence" (pp. 55-108) offers a contractarian theory of 
law in which consent serves as the basis for legal morality. The next 
three empirical sections seek to determine whether economic or con-
tractarian theories best fit the data from cases involving fraud, privacy, 
and implied warranty. The final section (pp. 299-320) suggests a social 
theory of secrecy and further develops the contractarian theory of law. 
Scheppele begins with some conceptual distinctions. Her interest 
is with strategic secrets - the withholding of information tq influence 
the actions or feelings of others. Such secrets are differentiated from 
"private secrets" withheld simply out of a desire for personal privacy. 
Scheppele views privacy as a condition of the autonomy individuals 
seek and secrecy as one of several means of obtaining it. Much infor-
mation withheld on privacy grounds does not have strategic purposes. 
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It helps to anchor an individual's sense of identity but does not seek to 
manipulate others. Conflicting interests are more clearly at stake 
where strat~gic secrets are concerned and the courts are an arena for 
resolving them. 
There are three major forms of secrets - direct, serial, and collec-
tive. In the direct secret, A withholds something from B that B wants 
to know. In the serial secret, A shares something with Band then a 
third person C seeks to learn A's secret from B. In the collective or 
shared secret, A and B create a secret and C seeks to learn the secret 
from either party. 
For these three instances there are two choices - to tell or not to 
tell (the middle ground offered by the hint is ignored). This leads 
Scheppele to identify six types of secrets based on the parties involved 
and whether the information is revealed or concealed. 
If A tells B a direct secret we have disclosure. If B tells C the serial 
secret we have betrayal. If A or B reveal their shared secret to C we 
have a leak. But what if the secret-keeper decides to hide the informa-
tion instead? This suggests three additional types. When A hides a 
direct secret from B we have a simple secret. If B withholds the serial 
secret from C we have a secondhand secret. If A or B keep a collective 
secret from C we have a conspiracy. 
A further distinction involves whether or not the target of the se-
cret suspects that there might be a secret. In that case we find shallow 
secrets. Deep secrets refer to cases where the subject does not imagine 
that relevant information might be had. The simple secret, second-
hand secret, and the conspiracy have deep and shallow forms. The 
depth of the secret is related to the kinds of claims which can be made 
by those left out of the secret, should they ever learn of its existence. 
These abstract categories help to frame the normative issues with 
respect to the party's obligations to each other. There are moral and 
legal justifications for and against each of the six types of secrets (dis-
closure, betrayal, leaks, simple secrets, secondhand secrets, and con-
spiracy). Scheppele's book is about how courts choose among the 
conflicting justifications individuals offer for keeping or disclosing 
secrets. Scheppele seeks the rules which best predict judicial behavior. 
The analysis is based on two samples. The first is a representative 
sample of cases still considered good law in the areas of fraud, privacy, 
and trade secrets. Rather than a random sample she sought a sample 
by rules. From two large legal encyclopedias which summarize Amer-
ican law -American Jurisprudence 2d and Corpus Juris Secundum -
she obtained citations for leading cases. In implied-warranty cases, in 
which she sought to catch movement over time, the sample is re-
stricted to one jurisdiction, New York, from 1796 to 1900. She labori-
ously went through every volume and selected all implied-warranty 
cases decided by New York's highest courts. 
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Regardless of their area of interest, social scientists unfamiliar with 
methods of analyzing legal texts will find a useful model here. Schep-
pele shows how the wealth of data contained within court records can 
be systematically gathered, sampled, and analyzed. She treats court 
texts as narratives which can be studied to determine a normative 
structure. Her very useful methodological appendix, "Studying the 
Common Law: An Introduction for Social Scientists," should be 
widely read by social researchers. 
In general, however, the book will be of greater interest to legal 
scholars concerned with doctrine than to social scientists interested in 
actual behavior and consequences. This is partly a difference in what 
one wishes to understand. Scheppele seeks a theory of jurisprudence 
for legal secrets, while most social researchers are not content with 
that. For them, the discovery of such a theory would yield a question 
rather than an answer. Such researchers want to know what the non-
ideological causes and correlates of the theory are. Interpretations are 
seen as data, not as causes, or at least not as sufficient causes. An 
interpretation is something itself which can be accounted for. Instead 
of viewing it as a cause, it can be viewed as a mask or as a conse-
quence. Even with careful observation and interviewing of judges, we 
can't automatically conclude that the written legitimation is in fact the 
proximate cause. Interpretations may be chosen because they engen-
der a communal gloss which justifies systematically favoring one set of 
interests against another. The interpretation then is seen as a tool used 
to obtain an end desired on prior grounds. We also must ask who 
gains and who loses, and how do varying strategies, structures, con-
texts, and characteristics of the parties come into play? 
In focusing on the substance of legal rules, Scheppele pays little 
attention to the large body of social research which finds that legal 
ideas are only one, and often not the most important, factor affecting 
legal processes. Even when they are relevant (or at least present, as 
with the cases Scheppele puts forth) their presence may be dependent 
on factors other than the deductive rationality from first principles 
which Scheppele assumes to be central. 
Early in the book she makes the reader aware of the social con-
struction of legal events: "The process of legal interpretation can be 
seen as the mutual construction of facts and rules" (p. 4). A card-
carrying sociologist of knowledge could not put it better. Scheppele 
seeks to understand how judges make sense of abstract norms in par-
ticular cases. She argues that both the facts of particular disputes and 
the textual rules used to resolve disputes are mutually constraining. 
Given this introduction, I was surprised at how little attention she 
pays to elements beyond facts and rules which can also affect interpre-
tation and outcome, as well as affect what is available to be seen as a 
fact or rule. Partly this is the issue of fish not worrying much about 
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the fact that they are in water, but a more macro approach looking at 
the issue historically and comparatively would yield additional 
insights. 
I found her analysis here too mechanistic and would like to know 
more about the factors (other than the substance of the doctrine and 
the "facts") which condition legal behavior. How do the characteris-
tics of the judge, court system, context, parties to the dispute (e.g., 
class, race, gender, reputation), and their attorneys (including their 
strategies and tactics) affect decisions? What are the causal factors 
beyond rational cognition that influence judges? What leads an ag-
grieved party to mobilize the law? How does the degree of deception 
and withholding affect perceptions? What are the social correlates of 
"rationality"? To what extent is it socially constructed as well, such 
that actors with different characteristics or in different structural set-
tings would see the same things differently? Surely the facts and rules 
chosen are conditioned by more than the moral philosophy of judges 
(however useful it may be to identify the most common cultural ele-
ments in such philosophies). 
It is an interesting sign of the times that a scholar can tell us she is 
concerned with issues of law and economics, and never once mention 
Karl Marx (other than to tell us in the preface that he, along with Max 
Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel, was trained in the law). 
Surely his law-and-economics approach might also offer some ideas to 
consider, even if they tum out to be empirically unsupported. 
Without disputing the doctrinal coherence that Scheppele reports 
finding, I would like to know what additional factors might account 
for this. The relevance of rules and the degree of their applicability is 
itself a variable with many correlates beyond content. Scheppele, un-
fortunately, pretty much ignores this. To be sure, the problem she has 
defined offers much to study. Yet her account would have been much 
richer had she confronted some of these additional issues as directly as 
she does the current law-and-economics view. Although concern with 
equal access to information is considered, a concern with other aspects 
of power and social status differential~ is noticeably absent from her 
treatment. It would not be difficult to create empirical tests to con-
trast the importance of other hypothesized causal factors such as so-
cial status differences (e.g., of the parties relative to each other), just as 
she has done for the contractarian and economic views. What hap-
pens when class and doctrine pull in opposite directions? How does 
class affect whether one is more likely to be the complainant or the 
defendant in the various types of secrecy cases? A more varied and 
interesting empirical pattern, one making greater demands on theory, 
might have emerged if additional variables had been considered and if 
the analysis was more grounded or situated in its social context. 
We are not told much about the origins of these legal ideas, nor of 
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their correlates. It is assumed that a variety of facts and rules are 
available; for Scheppele, the intellectual challenge is to see which are 
chosen by judges. But other analysts would not simply take these as 
given, and would also ask what it is that conditions the range of facts 
and rules from among which judges choose. 
Her theory is clearly stated and easily grasped, and is compelling 
relative to the more narrow economic view. Yet as with any account 
based only on one person's analysis, I was left wondering whether 
someone with a strong commitment to the economic view couldn't in 
good faith give a different interpretation to the data presented here, or 
emphasize other, more supportive cases. Since numbers count in both 
democracy and science, I would have more confidence in Scheppele's 
findings if they were based on consensus across coders and if she had 
stated her method more explicitly so that others could go through the 
process of checking her conclusions. Would "blind" coders, offered 
the two theories and these cases, reach the same conclusions? Perhaps 
they would. But the scientific grounds for her conclusions would be 
stronger if she could present data from several coders, rather than just 
one. In addition, it should be possible to document empirically 
whether individuals do in fact subscribe to the contractarian theory in 
the form that Scheppele argues. Even if judges follow it, her case for 
the rootedness of this view in the preferences of individuals is based on 
only one psychological study and her own reflections. There is an in-
teresting set of issues here around the linkage between mass attitudes 
and those of judicial elites. 
One criteria of good scholarship is whether it leaves the reader 
with questions. By this as well as other criteria this book is certainly a 
success. Among the questions that this provocative work raised for 
me: How well does the contractarian theory apply to rules about se-
crecy in other legal contexts, for example in Supreme Court or admin-
istrative decisions and legislative actions? Does it apply to judgments 
about secrecy beyond the law, as in primary and secondary relation-
ships? How well does it apply to other societies with Anglo traditions, 
to Western societies and industrial societies more generally, and to 
preliterate societies? Have contractarian norms become more impor-
tant as industrial society has evolved and become more complex? 
Have contractarian principles become more important over time, as 
the limits of unrestricted capitalism become clearer and nineteenth-
century power imbalances somewhat moderated? Is the spread of con-
tractarian principles associated with the rise of democracy? What 
happens when contractarian principles conflict (e.g., compassion and 
justice)? What are the implications of the development of ever more 
powerful technologies for discovering information that others wish to 
conceal (e.g., computer data bases, biotechnologies for truth determi-
nation, etc.)? Are these matched by ever better means of hiding infor-
mation (e.g., encryption), or as such techniques become more 
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widespread will legal rulings against wrongful concealment decline 
(since for a larger proportion of cases it will be assumed that, with 
diligence, the individual could have known)? How are the six types of 
secrets that Scheppele identifies distributed across social orders and 
what are their social consequences? 
Scheppele examines the legal description and justification of secrets 
as this involves the actions of judges in response to parties to a conflict. 
Many other aspects of secrecy and the law remain to be studied from a 
social science perspective. Future research work should look at things 
such as the culture, social structures, functions and dysfunctions, cor-
relates, and processes associated with secrecy such as the fourth and 
fifth amendments, secret trials, grand jury and in camera proceedings, 
sealed records, and protected witnesses and informers. What theories 
can help us best understand the logical opposite of secrecy, as with 
legally supported forms of forced disclosure such as compelled testi-
mony, subpoenas, undercover and electronic surveillance, and laws 
and policies involving informed consent and freedom of information? 
Do the contractarian ideas which help us understand judicial decision-
making in disputes also apply here, or must they be supplemented or 
replaced by other approaches? 
The two theories Scheppele examines have very different norma-
tive implications. The economic analysis is utilitarian. A single-end 
efficiency is identified and distributive consequences are ignored. All 
that matters is the total or the average, regardless of the consequences 
for particular individuals. Scheppele observes: 
Apart from allowing more different things to be independently valued 
and not requiring the collapse of all potential goods into a single scale of 
desire, the contractarian theory of law more straightforwardly embodies 
those ideals that law should embody in a democracy where consent is the 
basis oflegal and political obligation - namely, to be impartial (through 
the concern with symmetry), compassionate (through the provision of 
hedges against catastrophic loss), and just (through the triumph of prin-
ciples that transcend narrow self-interest, whether of individual or 
classes). In the contractarian view, the fairness of distributive outcomes 
again becomes an important question for law; and individuals are not 
trampled, or averaged out, for the common good. [pp. 84-85] 
As the ugliness and social fallout of 1980s-style self-interest become 
clearer, Scheppele's moral preference for a contractarian approach is 
compelling. 
